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This  paper  uses  the  Dialectic  Issue  LifeCycle-model  (DILC-model)  to analyze  the  co-evolution  of the  cli-
mate change  problem  and  strategic  responses  from  the  American  car industry.  The longitudinal  and
multi-dimensional  analysis  investigates  the dynamics  of  the climate  change  problem  in terms  of  socio-
political  mobilization  by social  movements,  scientists,  wider  publics  and policymakers.  It  also  analyses
how  U.S.  automakers  responded  to mounting  pressures  with  socio-political,  economic  and  innovation
strategies  oriented  towards  low-carbon  propulsion  technologies.  We  use  a mixed  methodology  with  a
quantitative  analysis  of various  time-series  and  an  in-depth  qualitative  case  study,  which  traces  inter-
actions  between  problem-related  pressures  and  industry  responses.  We  conclude  that U.S.  automakers
are slowly  reorienting  towards  low-carbon  technologies,  but  due  to weakening  pressures  have  not  yetncumbent ﬁrm
lectric-drive vehicle
ssue life-cycle
fully  committed  to  comprehensive  development  and  marketing.  The  paper  not only  applies  the  DILC-
model,  but  also  proposes  three  elaborations:  (a)  the  continued  diversity  of  technical  solutions,  and  ‘ups
and  downs’  in  future  expectations,  creates  uncertainty  which  delays  strategic  reorientation;  (b) ﬁrms
may  develop  radical  innovations  for  political  and  social  purposes  in early  phases  of the  model;  (c) issue
 by ex
ublislifecycles  are  also  shaped
©  2014  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
Climate change is one of the ‘grand challenges’ facing society,
equiring low-carbon innovation in many sectors and industries.
his paper is about low-carbon innovation and reorientation in
he American car industry, which can be expected to be a difﬁ-
ult process for several reasons. First, climate change constitutes a
ajor threat to the industry’s core technology (internal combustion
ngines (ICE)) and vested interests linked to sunk investments in
actories, skills and supply chains. So, to defend their interests and
nvestments, ﬁrms are likely to be reluctant or hesitant to engage
n low-carbon reorientation, and may  actively resist (especially in
arly phases of the process).
Second, if automakers accept the need for low-carbon reorien-
ation, they will have to invest in radical innovations, which in
apital- and scale-intensive industries such as car manufacturing
s very costly (not just because of R&D, but also because of factory
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 01273 930103.
E-mail addresses: c.penna@sussex.ac.uk (C.C.R. Penna), frank.geels@mbs.ac.uk
F.W. Geels).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.11.010
048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article unternal  inﬂuences  from  other  problems  and contexts.
hed  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
retooling, new production processes, establishment of supplier
networks, etc.) and risky (there is no guarantee that techni-
cal reorientations succeed). These risks are compounded by the
existence of multiple low-carbon innovations, which include: (a)
advanced internal combustion engines (aICE), based on improved
fuel-injection systems, turbo charging, advanced valve manage-
ment, etc.; (b) bio-fuel and ﬂex-fuels vehicles (FFV), which also
build on existing technical competencies; (c) fuel cell vehicles
(FCV); (d) battery-electric vehicles (BEV), which both would dis-
rupt existing competencies, and (e) hybrid-electric vehicles (HEV)
and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEV), which combine existing ICE-
competencies and new battery and electronic competencies. The
possibility of ‘betting on the wrong horse’ makes green reorienta-
tion a risky process with long-term strategic ramiﬁcations.
Third, because of the industry’s reluctance and risk-aversion,
green reorientation is likely to require increasing external selection
pressures on automakers. Since avoiding climate change is a collec-
tive good problem and because low-carbon innovations offer worse
price/performance characteristics (at least initially and under cur-
rent frame-conditions), such selection pressures are unlikely to
start in markets. Rather, pressures initially tend to come from
social movements, public opinion and policymakers, and may  later
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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pill over to consumers. These pressures may  go up, but can also
o down, which creates additional uncertainty for automakers
ith regard to green reorientation (e.g. about future toughness of
egulations or consumer willingness to pay for low-carbon inno-
ations). Furthermore, automakers may  actively try to inﬂuence
ocio-political pressures, which means that strategic considera-
ions are not just techno-economic, but also socio-political. So,
or several reasons, low-carbon reorientation in the car industry
s likely to be a difﬁcult and challenging process.
Against this background, the paper aims to describe and
xplain how American automakers have engaged with low-carbon
eorientation since the emergence of the climate change problem,
nd how far they have progressed. To address these issues and
uide the analysis, the paper uses the Dialectic Issue LifeCycle
DILC) model, which has been described in two  previous papers
Penna and Geels, 2012; Geels and Penna, 2015) that analyzed
he reorientation of American automakers in response to the
roblems of air pollution (1943–1985) and car accidents/safety
1900–1995), respectively. The DILC-model conceptualizes the
o-evolution between the dynamics of a societal problem (‘issue
ifecycle’), in terms of social and political mobilization processes
eading to pressures on an industry, and the dynamics of industry
esponses, including technical innovation and broader corpo-
ate strategies. The longitudinal interaction between a ‘problem
tream’ and a ‘solution stream’ (Kingdon, 1984) is conceptualized
s full of conﬂicts, tensions and struggles (hence the ‘dialectic’-
reﬁx) across socio-political, cultural and economic dimensions,
nfolding through ﬁve phases (see Section 2).
The paper aims to make empirical and conceptual contributions.
mpirically, the main contribution is to develop synthetic multi-
imensional account of low-carbon reorientation in the American
ar industry. The account is based on some original data-analysis
f patents, newspapers and congressional records, but mainly aims
o integrate many secondary sources (e.g. books, reports, academic
rticles). So, while acknowledging that a large literature already
xists on various aspects of low-carbon cars (see also Section
), we aim for a theory-guided integration. With the innovation
tudies community as our primary audience, we  particularly aim
o build on but go beyond the various studies in this commu-
ity of low-carbon innovations, e.g. FCV (Bakker, 2010; Van den
oed, 2005; Budde et al., 2012), HEV (Dijk and Yarime, 2010), BEV
Johnson, 1999; Dijk et al., 2013), and biofuels (Dufﬁeld et al., 2008).
hile these studies provide important insights about technical
olutions, we suggest that a comprehensive analysis should also
tudy interactions with the dynamics of societal problems related
o mobilization, public attention and political will.1 While these
tudies have analyzed innovation strategies such as R&D, patent-
ng, and technology partnerships, a comprehensive analysis should
lso address political, socio-cultural (‘framing’), and economic posi-
ioning strategies. And we  suggest that a comprehensive analysis
hould go beyond single technology studies, and address the diver-
ity of low-carbon innovations, because this creates additional
roblems for reorientation such as uncertainty about consumer
references and therefore risks of ‘betting on the wrong horse’. Our
ccount thus builds on innovation studies’ papers of low-carbon
echnologies, but also addresses other dimensions (mentioned in
ection 3). We  integrate the various studies using the DILC-model
s a theoretical template, which enables a systematic and dynamic
nalysis of interactions between various selection pressures and
ndustry responses.
1 Some papers, especially those that investigate the dynamics of expectations (e.g.
akker, 2010; Budde et al., 2012), do address some social and political dimensions,
ut this can be done more systematically.Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048
With regard to the DILC-model, the paper aims to replicate
the basic conceptual framework, broadening the model’s empiri-
cal base with a new case study. The paper also aims to use three
speciﬁcities of the case to make conceptual elaborations. First,
while the technical solution was  relatively clear in the two pre-
vious case studies (Penna and Geels, 2012; Geels and Penna, 2015),
it is less clear in the climate change case what the ‘best’ solu-
tion is because of the diversity of low-carbon innovations. In fact,
views about the ‘best’ solution have experienced ups-and-downs
in successive hype-disappointment cycles (Geels, 2012), which
enhance the strategic uncertainty ﬁrms face.2 So, the paper aims to
explore how the diversity of possible solutions conceptually affects
the DILC-model. Second, the case will show various examples of
ﬁrms developing new technologies for political and socio-cultural
purposes. We will use these instances to problematize the distinc-
tion between ‘symbolic’ industry responses (political and framing
strategies) and ‘substantive’ responses (technology development),
which so far underlies the DILC-model. Third, the case will show
that the climate change problem interacted with other problems
such as air pollution, fuel efﬁciency, energy security, and the eco-
nomic/ﬁnancial crisis. This means that the study of issue lifecycles
should not only look at internal problem dynamics (e.g. socio-
political mobilization, agenda-setting, political struggles), but also
acknowledge the importance of ‘issue linkage’, i.e. positive or neg-
ative linkages with other problems.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
DILC-model and develops further ideas with regard to the
three speciﬁcities. Section 3 discusses our quantitative–qualitative
methodology. Section 4 presents the results of the quantitative
analysis. Section 5 presents an in-depth longitudinal case study of
climate change and the American car industry (1979–2012). Sec-
tion 6 analyses the stage of the climate change issue lifecycle and
the degree of low-carbon reorientation of American automakers,
and discusses conceptual elaborations of the DILC-model. Section
7 provides concluding comments.
2. The Dialectic Issue LifeCycle (DILC) model
Penna and Geels (2012) developed the DILC-model by com-
bining insights from issue lifecycle theory (to conceptualize the
dynamics of social problems) and innovation studies (to con-
ceptualize the dynamics of technical ‘solutions’). They qualiﬁed
the DILC-model as dialectic to highlight the struggles between
the build-up of problem-related pressures and responses from
incumbent industry actors. To conceptualize these interactions, the
DILC-model uses the triple embeddedness framework (TEF) (Geels,
2014) as underlying model (Fig. 1). In the TEF, ﬁrms-in-industries
face selection pressures from an economic environment (resource
pressures from markets and suppliers) and a socio-political envi-
ronment (legitimacy pressures from social movements, public
discourse, policymakers). Firms-in-industries can respond to these
pressures (as indicated with the bi-directional arrows in Fig. 1)
through various strategies, e.g. innovation strategies and economic
positioning strategies (supply chain management, operations man-
agement, marketing) towards the economic environment, and
corporate political strategies (lobbying, ﬁnancial contributions to
political parties, constituency building, information strategies, etc.)
and socio-cultural strategies (public relations, advertising) towards
the socio-political environment.The triple embeddedness framework (TEF) helps articulate the
basic logic in the DILC-model: the lifecycle is conceptualized
as unfolding through ﬁve phases, in which a societal problem
2 We use the notion of hype-cycles, which was introduced by Gartner consultancy,
in a descriptive rather than evaluative (derogatory) sense.
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ubsequently affects additional selection pressures from various
nvironments: (1) activists; (2) wider publics and public attention;
3) policymakers in policy sub-systems, who investigate the prob-
em through hearings and inquiries and engages in debates about
ossible solutions; (4) politicians in macro-political arenas,3 who
ay  introduce substantive legislation; (5) consumers and market
emand. So, as an ideal-type, the DILC-model assumes that various
election pressures grow stronger over time and align with each
ther, which increasingly stimulate ﬁrms-in-industries to reori-
nt. The other side of the DILC-model concerns industry responses
o these increasing pressures, which tend to be defensive in the
rst three phases, when pressures mainly come from the industry’s
ocio-political environment.
In the ﬁrst three phases, incumbent ﬁrms are reluctant to
ake substantial change to address the problem, because they
re ‘locked in’ to industry regimes (Fig. 1), which consist of four
ndustry-speciﬁc institutions (Geels, 2014): (1) industry beliefs and
indsets; (2) identity and mission; (3) regulations and formal poli-
ies; (4) capabilities and technical knowledge. Firms are reluctant
o change these core regime elements in the ﬁrst three phases, and
end to ﬁght and resist using socio-cultural and political strate-
ies. In phase 1, they tend to downplay social problems. In phase
, when they (are forced to) acknowledge the issue, a common
actic is the creation of ‘closed industry fronts’ (Geels and Penna,
015), e.g. industry associations, which defend the industry as a
hole (politically or through framing strategies). Firms may  also
se innovation strategies to defend the existing regime (developing
ncremental solutions). In phase 3, incumbent ﬁrms and industry
ssociations will publicly defend the existing regime (using political
nd framing strategies to inﬂuence public opinion and the policy
ub-system). Privately, however, they may  begin to explore radi-
al solutions in R&D laboratories to hedge against possible future
olicies or changes in the economic environment. These efforts
ay  be spurred on by radical technology development activities
rom relative regime outsiders (e.g. foreign ﬁrms, suppliers, new
3 The distinction between policy sub-systems and macro-political arenas comes
rom the punctuated equilibrium theory in political science (True et al., 1999). The
ormer refers to less visible groups such as specialists in the bureaucracy, congres-
ional subgroups, interest groups and stakeholders, whereas the latter refers to more
isible actors in Parliament/Congress and the government. of industries (Geels, 2014: 266).
entrants), who  see rising public concerns about the problem as an
opportunity.
While the ﬁrst three phases are mainly about socio-political
mobilization and defence, the issue lifecycle gathers a new dynamic
in phases 4 and 5, when the problem begins to affect the economic
environment (Geels and Penna, 2015). In phase 4, escalating pub-
lic attention propels the problem into the macro-political arena
(True et al., 1999), where politicians may  introduce radical legisla-
tions that substantially change the economic frame conditions (e.g.
taxes, regulations, standards, subsidies, investments). Subsequent
implementation of this new policy often leads to struggles between
administrative agencies and the industry, which is likely to resist
and ﬁght back. In phase 5, the problem affects mass consumer
preferences (because of changing views on appropriate behaviour
or because of public policies), which creates market demand for
radically new technologies.
Corporate attention to the problem intensiﬁes in phases 4 and
5, as changing policies and consumer behaviour begin to affect the
economic environment. While industry associations may  still pub-
licly resist policy implementation in phase 4, individual ﬁrms also
begin to explore technical and market opportunities, which may
lead to the crumbling of closed industry fronts (Geels and Penna,
2015). In phases 4 and 5, incumbent ﬁrms thus begin to reorient
towards radical (‘substantive’) innovations, which is a costly and
risky process that often proceeds gradually (March, 1991), from
hedging and exploration (starting in phase 3) to strategic diver-
siﬁcation (phase 4), which is accompanied by changes in some
regime elements (technical capabilities and regulations), to full
reorientation (phase 5), which is accompanied by more founda-
tional changes in belief systems and mission. Reorientation may
accelerate when ﬁrst-mover advantages by leading ﬁrms results in
‘jockeying for position’ and an innovation race. Table 1 summarizes
the main aspects of this co-evolution of problem-related pressures
and industry responses in the DILC-model.
While the ideal-type representation in Table 1 assumes linear
increases in various problem-related pressures, Geels and Penna
(2015) elaborated the DILC-model by showing that pressures can
also weaken, producing more complex patterns. (In the analysis
of this paper (Section 6), we  therefore follow Turnheim and Geels
(2013) in developing a ‘pressure table’, which maps the tempo-
ral development of various pressures in the case study.) Geels
and Penna (2015) also demonstrated the importance of emerging
1032 C.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048
Table 1
A Summary of the DILC-model dynamics.
Phases Dynamics of societal ‘problems’ and associated ‘pressures’ Dynamics of ‘solutions’ and strategies of incumbent industries
Socio-political pressures Economic pressures Socio-cultural, and political
strategies
Technology and innovation
strategies
1: Problem emergence,
and industry neglect
The problem ﬁrst emerges
when activist groups articulate
concerns. Uncertainty about
causes and consequences gives
rise to sense-making.
No speciﬁc pressure from task
environment.
Incumbent ﬁrms do not
recognize the problem, or
downplay its importance.
No technology strategy is
deployed in response to the
issue.
2:  Rising public
concerns, and
defensive industry
responses
Activists create a social
movement that pushes the
issue onto public agendas.
Increasing public worries
create pressures on
policymakers who  express
concerns and create
committees (symbolic actions).
Relative regime outsiders (e.g.
suppliers, foreign ﬁrms, new
entrants) begin to develop
technical solutions.
If further denial of the problem
damages reputations, ﬁrms
defend themselves by creating
a closed industry front that
contests claims from social
movements and lobbies
policymakers.
Firms may develop
incremental technologies that
stay within the bounds of the
existing regime.
3:  Political
debates/controversies,
and defensive
hedging
Rising public attention pushes
the problem onto policy
sub-system agendas, leading to
formal hearings and
investigations.
Alternatives may ﬁnd a
foothold in small market
niches linked to ‘moral
consumers’.
Industry actors argue that
regulations are not necessary,
because they will ‘voluntarily’
implement (incremental)
solutions. They may also
emphasize costs or technical
complexity.
Incumbents publicly portray
radical solutions as unfeasible.
For defensive reasons,
however, industry actors may
hedge and privately explore
radical solutions in
laboratories.
4: Formation and
implementation of
substantive policy,
and industry
diversiﬁcation
Escalating public concerns
pushes the problem onto
macro-political agendas where
politicians may  introduce
radical legislation. This is
followed by policy
implementation by
administrative agencies.
Regime outsiders lead
developments targeted at the
growing (but limited) ‘moral
consumer’ market segment.
However, concerns do not (yet)
spill over to mainstream
markets.
Firms and industry
associations contest the
formation and implementation
of radical policies. First-mover
ﬁrms may, however, argue for
tougher regulations to raise
costs for competitors.
Firms diversify and increase
R&D investments in radical
alternatives. Individual ﬁrms
embrace the new technology
more enthusiastically to
‘jockey for position’ in the
expectation of growing
markets. This could cause
cracks in the closed industry
front and lead to an ‘innovation
race’.
5:  Spillovers to the task
environment, and
strategic
reorientation
The problem may  lead to new markets when public
discourses lead to changes in mainstream consumer
preferences or when regulators substantially change
economic frame conditions (through taxes, incentives,
To take advantage of economic opportunities, incumbents
reorient towards the new technology and markets.
Addressing the problem also becomes part of the
industry’s core beliefs and mission, leading to further
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echnical and economic opportunities, particularly (expectations of)
ubstantial market demand, for industry reorientation in phases 4
nd 5, besides socio-political pressures. So, small or stagnant green
arket demand is likely to hinder low-carbon industry reorienta-
ion.
This paper aims to make three further elaborations. First, the
ILC-model implicitly assumes that there is one radical innova-
ion to which incumbent ﬁrms reorient in the fourth and ﬁfth
hase. The case study is more complex, however, because multi-
le low-carbon cars co-exist simultaneously. Furthermore, views
bout the best low-carbon car have changed substantially in the
ast two decades (Geels, 2012). So, while Geels and Penna (2015)
xplored ups-and-downs in problem-related pressures, this paper
lso investigates the effects of ups-and-downs regarding various
echnical solutions. Because the multitude of technical solutions
nd their ups-and-downs creates additional uncertainty, it may  be
hat hedging (in phase 3) lasts longer, delaying strategic diversiﬁ-
ation and full reorientation towards radical options (in phases 4
nd 5).
Second, we aim to nuance the distinction between ‘symbolic’
nd ‘substantive’ ﬁrm strategies, which the DILC-model borrowed
rom Mahon and Waddock (1992, p. 27), who deﬁned these con-
epts as follows: “Symbolic action involves attempts to ‘frame’ an
ssue. (. . .)  Substantive action, in contrast, involves deﬁnitive moves
hat attempt to actually change or deal with the existing situation
n speciﬁc, identiﬁable ways. It often demands the expenditure oftransformation of the industry regime.
resources (money, equipment, personnel, etc.) to minimally show
progress in resolving the actual problem identiﬁed”. The current
DILC-model assumes that ﬁrms initially give more emphasis to
symbolic actions (phases 1 and 2) and gradually shift towards more
substantive action (particularly technological innovation) when
problem-related pressures increase (phases 3–5). This paper aims
to nuance this conceptualisation by recognizing that technological
development can also be used for symbolic purposes (e.g. enhanc-
ing public reputations) and political purposes (e.g. showing that
certain options are unfeasible or that regulations are not neces-
sary) in early phases. “Carefully chosen displays of symbolism may
circumvent the need for substantive change entirely. (. . .)  Outputs
[e.g. technologies], procedures, structures, and personnel can all
signal that the organization labours on the side of the angels–even
if these supposed indicators amount to little more than face work”
(Suchman, 1995, p. 588). So, automakers may  engage in radical
innovation (e.g. low-carbon prototype cars) in early phases for
symbolic and political reasons, e.g. signalling to external stakehold-
ers that they are committed to solving environmental problems.
This means that we  may  have to nuance the sequential view on
technological reorientation in the current DILC-model (incremental
innovation – hedging – diversiﬁcation – full reorientation towards
radical innovation).
Third, because of its lifecycle logic the DILC-model focuses
mainly on the internal dynamics (struggles between actors con-
cerned about a problem and industry actors) that drive the process
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While this quantitative approach allows for the identiﬁcation
of general patterns and associations, it does not reveal causal
relationships. To identify deeper causation, we also perform a
longitudinal qualitative case study, which analyses interactionsC.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Res
orward. The Triple Embeddedness Framework (Fig. 1) suggests,
owever, that the industry not only experiences pressures from the
ocal problem (in this case, climate change). Rather, industries typi-
ally experience multiple pressures in socio-political and economic
nvironments, e.g. recessions leading to shrinking markets, rising
il prices that change market demand, other social or environmen-
al problems (e.g. local air pollution, energy security concerns). So,
 study of low-carbon reorientation should not only investigate the
nternal issue lifecycle dynamics, but also how other pressures in
ndustry environments may  inﬂuence these dynamics, positively
r negatively. In other words, such a study must account for the
ossibility of interactions between multiple problem streams.
We  will further explore these three issues empirically in the case
tudy, and return to them in Section 6.
. Methodology and data sources
The case study focuses on climate change and responses of the
merican car industry (1979–2012). We  selected the car industry,
ecause passenger cars are very high producers of carbon emis-
ions worldwide (accounting to 12% of total US emissions in 20114).
e focused on the U.S. because it represents an extreme case:
e expect struggle and contestation to be particularly present in
merica due to confrontational relations between industry and
olicy/society. Our focus on the U.S. has two principal limitations.
irstly, foreign-owned car companies also operate and produce in
he American. market. To address this limitation we include dis-
ussion of foreign carmaker strategies, which exert pressures on
domestic’ automakers.5 Secondly, American automakers operate
n other parts of the world. We  therefore also discuss some global
evelopments (e.g. climate change policies in Europe and Japan) as
ressures on the American car industry.
We apply a novel combined quantitative–qualitative method-
logy, initially adopted by Geels and Penna (2015). The novelty
f this approach consists in using quantitative methods within an
ssue lifecycle framework (the DILC-model) to identify initial pat-
erns of proxy variables through time. These initial ﬁndings are
hen further explored with an in-depth qualitative analysis to iden-
ify causal relationships and mechanisms. We  also use the analysis
f time-series to divide the whole period into shorter ones.6 The
roxy variables are rough indicators and thus need to be used with
ome caution. For the quantitative analysis, we  used the following
roxies:
For public attention we use the number of newspaper articles on
climate change as proxy (Newig, 2004). We  searched the Nexis
database for newspaper articles (New York Times,  USA Today,  Wall
Street Journal, and Washington Post) with the keywords “climate
change”, “global warming” or “greenhouse effect” (and derivates)
in their headlines.
For policy-making activities (congressional attention) and policy-
implementation activities (executive branch attention), we used
climate-change related entries in the Congressional Record and the
4 See http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f13033a.pdf [accessed
6.10.14].
5 While our focus is on the industry population and its environments, we  also
iscuss ﬁrm-level dynamics. However, we do not account for within-ﬁrm struggles,
hich would add a fourth analytical level, being beyond the scope of this paper.
6 The combined quantitative–qualitative methodology is fully developed and
laborated in Penna (2014), who  proposed the use of three quantitative approaches
namely, visual examination of time series representations of proxy indicators;
eta correlation analysis; and statistical tests for unknown structural breaks) in
ombination with a narrative approach within an issue life-cycle framework.Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048 1033
Federal Register, respectively.7 We  searched these publications in
the HeinOnline database with the same keyword string as above.8
• We  used article count in the Automotive News (American edition)
as a proxy for how much attention American automakers ded-
icate to climate change (same search string as above). We  also
used this database to trace ups-and-downs in industry atten-
tion to different drivetrain technologies (FCV, BEV, HEV, aICE and
biofuel/ﬂex-fuel vehicles), searching for articles with keyword-
strings related to each of them.9
• We  use patents as a proxy for technical development by the auto
industry. We searched the USPTO database for patents related to
the different drivetrain technologies.10 Our  search methodology
follows Oltra et al. (2008) for the identiﬁcation of ‘eco-patents’
on environmental technologies and ‘green’ products, which com-
bines in the search string keywords and patent classes related
to the focal-technology (see example in Table 2). This method
allows for a reduction in ‘noise’ (i.e. exclusion of irrelevant
patents, inclusion of relevant ones). We  restricted our search to
the three largest American car manufacturers (and their con-
trolled subsidiaries11): General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (the
‘Big Three’). Duplicated patents were excluded.
The resulting set was ordered according to the patent’s priority
date, which is the date of the ﬁrst ﬁling of a similar claim in any
patent ofﬁce, in order to better reﬂect the timing of the invention.
To address the lag between ﬁling and issuing a patent (which
leads to a decline in the number of patents in more recent years),
we divided the number of patents of interest per year by the total
number of patents per year by the selected carmakers to arrive
at a percentage index.
We also plotted the market share (relative sales) of the different
green technologies in the U.S. market (compiled from the Electric
Drive Transportation Association (EDTA); the U.S. Energy Information
Agency;  and Ward’s Automotive). A complication concerns ﬁgures
for ﬂex-fuel vehicles, which can be fuelled either with ethanol or
gasoline or both, and thus may  overestimate the share of ‘alterna-
tive’ fuel vehicles.
The quantitative analysis consists of two  steps: (a) ﬁrstly, we
performed a ‘Quandt Likelihood Ratio’ (QLR) test for unknown
structural breaks (see Stock and Watson, 2011, pp. 600–603), in
order to identify signiﬁcant breaks in the time-series12; and (b)
secondly, we  triangulated these ﬁndings with a visual examination
of the plotted time-series and our substantive knowledge of key
events in the case study to establish sub-periods.7 The Congressional Record publishes transcripts of hearings, debates and speeches
and  bill proposals, indicating evolving attention to issues. The Federal Register
publishes regulatory agency’s notiﬁcations and rules and (presidential) executive
orders, two  key types of policy-implementation action at the U.S. Federal level.
8 Proxies for attention present certain limitations, such as not reﬂecting changes in
the interpretation of the issue, size of articles, or intensity of congressional activity.
We  aim to further access the sensitivity and intensity of public and political attention
to climate change in the in-depth qualitative case study.
9 Articles citing more than one technology were assigned to all cited technologies.
10 We used AcclaimIP patent search and analysis application:
https://www.acclaimip.com/ (last accessed on 12.04.13).
11 Controlled subsidiaries were identiﬁed through the analysis of a selection of
each  company’s ﬁnancial reports (and ﬁlings to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission), combined with the knowledge of the authors about the automotive
industry.
12 Our tests included up to four lags (ﬁve restrictions), and were applied to the
natural logarithm of the variables. All statistics’ procedures were performed with
Stata 12.
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Table 2
Example of patent search string (HEV-related patents in the USPTO assigned to General Motors).
Technology AcclaimIP search string Keywords Classes Assignees
Hybrid-Electric Vehicles
((PSCLS:180/65.21 OR PSCLS:903) OR (TTL:((“hybrid
vehicle” OR “hybrid electric vehicle” OR “hybrid
propulsion” OR “hybrid powertrain” OR “hybrid
powerplant”) NOT “fuel cell”)) OR (ABST:((“hybrid
vehicle” OR “hybrid electric vehicle” OR “hybrid
propulsion” OR “hybrid powertrain” OR “hybrid
powerplant”) NOT “fuel cell”)) OR (ACLM:((“hybrid
vehicle” OR “hybrid electric vehicle” OR “hybrid
propulsion” OR “hybrid powertrain” OR “hybrid
powerplant”) NOT “fuel cell”))) AND (AN:(“general
motors” OR “Delphi Technologies” OR “delphi
technology” OR “gm global” OR “gen motors” OR
“delco electronics” OR “Saturn Corporation”)
“hybrid vehicle”,
“hybrid electric
vehicle”, “hybrid
propulsion”, “hybrid
powertrain”, “hybrid
powerplant”
180/65.21 (and
subclasses), 903 (and
subclasses)
“general motors”,
“delphi technologies”,
“delphi technology”,
“gm global”, “gen
motors”, “delco
electronics”, “Saturn
Corporation”
Comment: We searched for keywords in the patent’s
title (TTL), abstract (ABST) and claims (ACLM). The
“AN” operator searches the patent assignee ﬁeld for
certain keywords. The operator “PSCLS” searches for
patents with the deﬁned primary patent class(es) and
all  subclasses under the speciﬁc parent class.
Comment: We excluded
patents citing “fuel
cell”. The assignee
restriction increases
conﬁdence that the
patents are related to
car technologies.
Comment: The 65.21
subclass is for “hybrid
vehicles” under the
class 180 (“motor
vehicles”). The class
903 is a speciﬁc class
for HEV-related
Comment: We included
words related to
General motors and its
controlled subsidiaries
that are known to ﬁle
most of the OEM’s
patents.
b
m
n
d
j
e
a
i
(
d
t
L
d
2
M
i
r
2
a
c
4
p
a
a
F
b
p
a
c
b
o
E
a
f
w
i
H
A
industry attention, which suggests that biofuels and ﬂex-fuels
were incremental innovations (requiring some tinkering withetween problem-related pressures and industry responses. Pri-
ary sources for developments in civil society are articles from
ewspapers and magazines (New York Times, Economist).  We also
raw on governmental documents (CARB, EDTA/USDoE), industry
ournals (Ward’s, Automotive News), and publications by automak-
rs and their trade association. In addition, we build on secondary
ccounts of different aspects of climate change and the car
ndustry: science, environmental movement and public opinion
Corfee-Morlot et al., 2007; Dunlap and colleagues); policy and legal
evelopments (Dufﬁeld et al., 2008; Meltz, 2008); corporate cul-
ural and political strategies (Doyle, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2001;
uger, 2000); automakers’ innovation strategies and technological
evelopments (Abeles, 2004; Bakker and colleagues; Budde et al.,
012; Dijk et al., 2013; Johnson, 1999; Kemp, 2005; Lutsey, 2012;
acCormack, 2005; Mondt, 2000; Van den Hoed, 2005); broader
ndustry contexts and ﬁnancial dimensions (Ingrassia, 2010); envi-
onmental challenges facing the car industry (Sperling and Gordon,
009). Drawing on various primary and secondary sources we
im to develop a comprehensive multi-dimensional analysis of the
limate-change problem and car industry responses.
. Quantitative results
Fig. 2 presents time-series representations of proxies for: (a)
ublic attention to climate change; (b) congressional attention
nd executive attention; (c) attention by Automotive News; (d)
ggregated Alternative Fuel Vehicle (AFV) patents by the Big Three.
ig. 3 presents time-series representations of proxies for: attention
y Automotive News to electric-drive technologies, which com-
rises FCV, HEV, PHEV and BEV (Fig. 3a) and aICE technologies
nd biofuel/ﬂex-fuel vehicles (Fig. 3b); Big Three patenting of spe-
iﬁc technologies (electric-drive technologies in 3c and aICE and
iofuel/ﬂex-fuel vehicles in 3d). Fig. 4a shows the market share
f alternative fuel vehicles and Fig. 4d shows the market share of
lectric Drive Vehicles (EDV).
To determine periods and break points (already represented
bove with vertical dotted lines), we used the results of QLR-tests
or structural breaks in selected time-series, presented in Table 3,
hich we have linked to certain key events: (a) the ﬁrst break
n public and congressional attention link with the 1988 Senate
earings on global warming; (b) public attention, Congress and
utomotive News have all breaks associated with Kyoto; (c)technologies.
all series have a break in the mid-2000s, when climate change
became a highly salient issue; (d) patenting and sales time-series
also have breaks associated with intra-industry events (e.g. GM’s
development of the EV Impact in early 1990s, the establishment of
the battery development partnership USABC, Toyota’s launching
of the Prius, and the consolidation of the HEV market).
Based on this analysis and a visual examination of charts in
Figs. 2(a–d), 3(a–d) and 4 (a and b) we distinguish ﬁve periods:
1979–1988 (when climate change had low salience); 1988–1997
(moderate public and political attention, and some patenting activ-
ity); 1997–2005 (gradual rise in public attention, political attention,
and patenting); 2005–2009 (rapidly increasing public and political
attention, accelerated patenting and HEV-sales); and 2009–2012
(declining public and political attention because of the ﬁnancial
crisis, oscillating HEV-sales, but increasing executive activity and
patenting).
The charts in Fig. 3 show the occurrence of various tech-
nology hype-cycles. We  distinguish ﬁve overlapping cycles: 1st
BEV hype (1988–early-2000s); HEV hype (2001–2009); FCV hype
(1995–2009); biofuel hype (2006–2009) and new BEV hype (2005
onwards). The ups-and-downs come out stronger in the Auto-
motive News attention graphs (Fig. 3a and b) than in the patent
graph (Fig. 3c and d). This suggests that technological development
may  continue after attention bubbles have burst. Throughout the
whole period, there is steady rise in patenting of all alternative
technologies (Fig. 2d), which indicates increasing development of
low-carbon technologies, despite ﬂuctuating industry attention to
climate change (Fig. 2c). The qualitative case study will further ana-
lyze the drivers of various hype-cycles and their inﬂuences on the
lifecycle process. Based on these quantitative results we advance
four further observations.
• Industry attention and technology strategy towards ﬂex-fuel
vehicles and biofuels increased substantially by 2005 (Fig. 3b
and d). Patenting activity, however, increased relatively less thanICE, but no substantial redesign that warranted patenting). The
relatively low degree of biofuel patenting is even more striking if
we consider the fact that biofuels/ﬂex-fuels have reached some
degree of market penetration (Fig. 4a).
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tation
•
•Fig. 2. (a–d, top-down) Visual represen
Incremental improvements with aICE have been pursued
throughout the entire period, but accelerated in the early 2005,
indicating a ‘sailing ship’ effect, whereby threats from radical
technologies stimulate old technology improvements.
By 2010, there is substantial patenting activity for all technical
options, which suggests that ﬁrms remain uncertain about which
powertrain option will prevail, and therefore adopt a hedging
strategy. of proxy variables deﬁned in Section 3.
• Despite the attention and patenting in electric drive vehicles,
Fig. 4a and b shows that actual market diffusion of alternative
fuel vehicles is dominated by biofuel/ﬂex-fuel vehicles (FFVs).
In later periods, the share of EDVs grows, but still constitutes
just a few percentage of the total market, creating uncertain-
ties about mass diffusion of EDVs (the market share of EDVs
remained stagnant at 3.52% in 2013 (EDTA, 2014)). This may
make automakers reluctant to abandon ICE vehicles, as small
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Fig. 3. (a–d, top-down) Visual representation of proxy variables deﬁned in Section 3.
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EDV-sales do not (yet) offset the risks of strategic technological
reorientation.
The next section will further analyze casual connections and
ynamic relationships.
. Qualitative case study of climate change and the U.S. car
ndustryWe  now turn to the qualitative analysis of the ﬁve periods:
979–1988, 1988–1997, 1997–2005, 2005–2009, and 2009–2012.
sing the DILC-model as an ideal-type, we describe for each period:
able 3
esults of QLR tests for structural breaks and key episodes in the climate change issue life
Breaks 
Public attention to climate change 1986–1988*
1996+
2005–2007*
Congressional attention to climate
change
1984–1989*
1992–1997*
2006–2007*
Executive attention to climate change 2004–2007*
Automotive News attention to climate
change
1995–1998*
2007*
Big  Three AFV patents 1986–1990*
2005–2006*
Electric Drive market share 2000*
2003–2005*
HEV  market share 2000*
2003–2007*
* Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
+ Insigniﬁcant local peak of QLR statistic.e of AFVs and EDVs, respectively.
(1) problem-related pressures (from science, social movements,
public opinion, policymakers); (2) response strategies from the car
industry.
5.1. Problem emergence, sense-making and industry indifference
(1979–1988)
5.1.1. Pressures around issue
5.1.1.1. Science, social movements, public attention. In the 1970s,
climate change emerged as a permanent research topic at scien-
tiﬁc meetings and conferences, where possible causes, effects and
uncertainties were discussed (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2007). The envi-
ronmental movement began calling for measures to tackle global
cycle.
Key episodes
1988: New York Times announces “Global Warming has begun”
1997: Kyoto Protocol
2005: Hollywood’s Day after tomorrow
2007: Nobel Peace Prize to IPCC and Al Gore
1988: Senate Hearings on Global Warming
1997: Debate on Kyoto Protocol
2005: Energy Security Act
2005: Second Bush (Jr.) administration
2007: Supreme Court’s decision on EPA responsibility to regulate GHG
emissions from cars
Before-1997: industry denies climate change
After-1997: industry begins to acknowledge climate change
2007: Supreme Court’s decision (+ Nobel Prize to IPCC/Al Gore)
Late-1980s: GM develops EV model Impact
Mid-2000s: multiple technology hype cycles, Big Three catching up
with HEV technology
2000: Toyota starts selling Prius (HEV) in U.S.
Mid-2000s: consolidation of HEV market niche
2000: Toyota starts selling Prius (HEV) in U.S.
Mid-2000s: consolidation of HEV market niche
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Table 4
CARB original sales requirements under the LEV/ZEV mandate (Kemp, 2005, p. 175).
Model year Conventional vehicles Transitional low emission
vehicles (TLEV)
Low emission
vehicles (LEV)
Ultra-low emission
vehicles (ULEV)
Zero-emission
vehicles (ZEV)
1994 90% 10% – – –
1995  85% 15% – – –
1996  80% 20% – – –
1997  73% – 25% 2% –
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opportunity to shape the policy process. While the original regula-
tion survived the ﬁrst two  reviews, CARB (California Air Resources1998–2000  48% – 
2001–2002  – – 
2003  – – 
arming. Public attention remained low (Fig. 2a), because envi-
onmental news was dominated by other issues such as nuclear
nergy, acid rain and the ozone hole (Dunlap, 1992).
.1.1.2. Policy-makers. American political activity was  symbolic,
eading to a few Senate hearings and research funding decisions
Rothenberg and Levy, 2012). Senator Al Gore and others wrote a
ublic letter (1986) declaring to be ‘deeply disturbed’ about climate
hange and calling for policy action (Yergin, 2011).
While climate change received little attention, policymakers
ere very concerned about energy security because of the ﬁrst
1973) and second (1979) oil crisis. In 1974, they had therefore
nacted fuel economy regulations. The CAFE (Corporate Average
uel Efﬁciency) standards started at 18 MPG  for 1978 models and
ould increase to 27.5 MPG  in 1985. Because American automak-
rs were oriented towards gas-guzzling vehicles (and had just
pened the new ‘light-truck’ segment), they found it hard to com-
ly (Ingrassia, 2010), leading the NHTSA (National Highway and
rafﬁc Safety Administration) to postpone the 27.5 MPG  require-
ent to 1990. Although CAFE standards were originally created to
ddress the energy security issue, by the mid-2000s environmen-
alists and policy-makers would call for their strengthening as a
ay to address CO2 emissions.
.1.2. Car industry issue responses
The car industry was unconcerned with climate change
Rothenberg and Levy, 2012). Automakers did engage with air
ollution regulations by introducing the three-way catalytic con-
erter innovation in 1983, but were generally not concerned about
nvironmental issues (Penna and Geels, 2012). They were more
nterested in the opening up of the new market segment, starting
ith Chrysler’s Minivan (1983), and morphing into Sports Utility
ehicles (SUVs). This market segment, which commanded high
roﬁt-margins (Ingrassia, 2010), was purposively designated as
light-trucks’ (implying they were for commercial use), so that this
ategory became subject to more lenient fuel economy standards
Luger, 2000).
.2. Rising public concerns and the creation of a closed
ndustry-front (1988–1997)
.2.1. Pressures around issue
.2.1.1. Science, social movements, public attention. Public attention
ncreased in the late-1980s and early 1990s (Fig. 2a) because of
ot summers (record-high temperatures, droughts), the 1988 Sen-
te Hearing on global warming (see below), and framing struggles
etween scientists/environmentalists and climate-sceptics sup-
orted by industry (Doyle, 2000; Luger, 2000). The newly created
1988) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also stim-
lated public attention with comprehensive assessment reports (in
990 and 1996), which reviewed and integrated scientiﬁc ﬁndings
Corfee-Morlot et al., 2007).48% 2% 2%
90% 5% 5%
75% 15% 10%
5.2.1.2. Policy-makers. Political action occurred at multiple levels.
The ﬁrst IPCC report (1990) provided the basis for international
negotiations, which resulted in the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit. Although Rio-1992 established the goal of stabilizing
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, the Framework was a vol-
untary, non-binding agreement (Kolk and Levy, 2001). In 1995
(Berlin), signatory parties agreed that targets would be formu-
lated for industrialized nations but not for developing countries.
In 1996 (Geneva), parties accepted the ﬁndings from the second
IPCC assessment report, and called for legally binding targets and
timeframes (Corfee-Morlot et al., 2007).
At the U.S. Federal level, the 1988 Senate hearings marked the
emergence of climate change as a political issue (in policy sub-
systems and (brieﬂy) at the macro-political level). The testimony
of NASA climate scientist James Hansen was widely reported in the
mass media, and politicians began jockeying for the fatherhood of a
‘global warming act’, proposing various bills that addressed global
warming via fuel economy legislation or clean air policy (Doyle,
2000).13 These bills failed to pass because of strong corporate lob-
bying or threats that the President would use his veto (Luger, 2000).
Instead of targets and regulations, Bush (senior) preferred a volun-
tary approach through public–private partnerships (PPPs) aimed at
developing advanced technologies and promoting alternative fuels
(mainly ethanol/methanol) (Dufﬁeld et al., 2008; Yergin, 2011). The
newly elected (1993) president Clinton also preferred collaboration
to legislation, and established the Partnership for a New Genera-
tion of Vehicles. In return for industry participation, he offered a
moratorium on mandated fuel economy increases (Luger, 2000).
At the U.S. state level, California’s ‘Zero-Emission Vehicle’ (ZEV)
mandate (1990) was  a radical legislation that required the seven
biggest automakers to sell a ﬂeet mix  that included different cat-
egories of vehicles according to increasingly stringent emission
levels (Table 4) and setting a tough ﬁne ($5000) per non-compliant
vehicle (Kemp, 2005). The mandate was initially formulated as a
solution to local air pollution problems, but increasingly became
part of California’s strategy to control GHG emissions (CARB, 2012).
The ZEV-plan was  in effect a sales mandate, because “battery-
powered electric vehicles were the only zero emission automotive
technology on the horizon” (Doyle, 2000, p. 274). By 1994, other
states were considering to adopt the Californian ZEV mandate,
which led the Big Three (GM, Ford, Chrysler) to start an intense lob-
bying campaign (Sperling and Gordon, 2009). The ZEV-regulation
also established biannual reviews, which offered carmakers an13 Examples are the Global Warming Prevention Act (which included a fuel efﬁ-
ciency mandate of 45 MPG  for cars and 35 MPG  for trucks by 2004); the National
Energy Policy Act; the World Environment Act (sponsored by Senator Al Gore); the
Global Environmental Protection Act (calling for a 50% reduction in automotive carbon
emissions, equivalent to a fuel economy standard of 55 MPG).
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orrespond to the operating proﬁt (loss) of the Chrysler Group of DaimlerChrysler).
oard) dropped the 1998–2002 requirements in 1996 under great
ressure from automakers (Kemp, 2005).
.2.2. Car industry issue responses
.2.2.1. Social-cultural strategies. In 1989, the Big Three, the Ameri-
an Automobile Manufacturers Association (AAMA), and forty other
merican companies formed the Global Climate Coalition (GCC),
hich created a ‘closed industry front’ that attacked global warm-
ng science and accused the IPCC of downplaying uncertainties
Kolk and Levy, 2001). American automakers also set up civilian
astroturf’ organizations to create pressure on politicians. The Coali-
ion for Vehicle Choice (CVC), for instance, initiated letter-writing
ampaigns to politicians and promoted the view that stricter CAFE
tandards would limit vehicle choice and ‘outlaw’ SUVs and pick-
ps (Luger, 2000).
.2.2.2. Political strategies. Automakers attacked the Californian
EV mandate, with the AAMA ofﬁcially establishing the strategic
oal of “creating a climate in which the [California EV] mandate
. . .]  can be repealed” (cited in Doyle, 2000, p. 294). For the ZEV-
andate’s third review (1996) the Big Three aligned their positions,
omplaining about the state of battery development, low consumer
emand, and lack of infrastructure (Johnson, 1999); “the automak-
rs joined together to insure that none of them separately would go
ut ahead of the others – although GM clearly had the technologi-
al lead” (Doyle, 2000, p. 322). An independent ‘Battery Technology
dvisory Panel’ also concluded that battery costs would represent a
arrier to EV diffusion by 1998 (Kemp, 2005). In 1996, CARB decided
o drop the 1998–2002 sales requirements.
American automakers also opposed Federal proposals to
ncrease fuel economy standards. Financial contributions incen-
ivized politicians to vote against legislation, resulting in “a strong
orrelation between the amount of money received from the auto
ndustry and [Senators’] votes” on CAFE proposals (Luger, 2000, p.
68).
.2.2.3. Innovation strategies. Environmental technology strate-
ies of American automakers mostly focused on incremental
nnovations such as advanced-Internal Combustion Engine (aICE)
echnologies (Fig. 3d), which included improved fuel injection sys-
ems and lean-burn catalysts (Mondt, 2000). Another strategy to
efend existing ICE technology was the development of ethanol-
uelled or ﬂex-fuel vehicles (FFV), which were capable of running
n methanol/ethanol or gasoline or a mixture of both (e.g. E85,na, 2015 and companies’ ﬁnancial statements) (from 1998–2006, Chrysler’s ﬁgures
an 85% ethanol-gas mixture). Automakers also focused on FFVs
because the 1988 Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) assigned
CAFE credits to their production (Dufﬁeld et al., 2008). By 1997
almost 85,000 E85 Flex-Fuel Vehicles were sold, leased or converted
(Fig. 3c).
Carmakers (except GM)  gave relatively little innovative atten-
tion to alternative powertrain technologies (Van den Hoed, 2005).
In the late 1980s, General Motors dedicated some resources
to a radical innovation (BEV) for reputational reasons. The
Impact-prototype was meant to demonstrate that GM  was not a
stale, boring company, but still mustered innovative capabilities
(Johnson, 1999). But the Impact ‘show-car’ generated so much pos-
itive publicity at the Los Angeles Motor Show (1990) that GM
announced it would market the car (Doyle, 2000). CARB interpreted
this announcement as an indication that BEVs were sufﬁciently
developed, and issued the ZEV mandate (Kemp, 2005). Subse-
quently, GM created a 400-person, $300-million BEV programme
(Doyle, 2000) to produce 25,000 vehicles per year by 2000 (Kemp,
2005).
To contain the possibility of an innovation race, the Big Three
formed another closed industry-front (1991) so that all companies
would move together technologically. The U.S. Advanced Battery
Consortium (USABC) was  a public-private partnership launched by
President Bush (senior) and the Big Three. Although most of the
funds came from the Department of Energy (DoE), the Big Three
ran the programme and decided which battery developers and
projects received grants (Doyle, 2000). The USABC fulﬁlled sev-
eral roles for American automakers (Luger, 2000): (a) improving
their public reputation; (b) controlling technical development; (c)
managing technological expectations through the establishment of
(unrealistic) mid-term goals (such as a minimum driving range of
150-miles); and (d) controlling the release of technical informa-
tion to policymakers to prevent that standards would be ratcheted
up. According to a former GM employee, “the automakers formed
USABC to hinder rather than enhance product development by con-
trolling research and development efforts” (cited in Doyle, 2000, p.
309).
In 1992, GM down-scaled its BEV project to a small $32-million
demonstration programme (Kemp, 2005). GM decided to lease
its electric car for $33,995, about half of real costs of $78,000
(MacCormack, 2005). By 1996–1997, GM had leased about 760
units (MacCormack, 2005), which was  far below initial expecta-
tions. Critics accused GM of deliberately under-promoting electric
cars (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
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In 1993 American automakers also joined the Partnership for a
ew Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), another PPP to develop tech-
ological solutions to the issues of energy security and global
arming. This $300-million joint-venture with Federal research
aboratories aimed at developing a ‘production prototype’ by 2003,
apable of reaching fuel economy of 80 MPG, without sacriﬁcing
ize, performance or safety (Doyle, 2000). PNGV served similar
urposes as USBAC: directing technical developments, controlling
echnological expectations and playing on information asymme-
ries. In exchange for their participation the Big Three also secured
 moratorium on Federal CAFE increases (Luger, 2000). The Big
hree also used the PNGV to pre-empt regulatory action, claiming
hat self-regulation and PPPs were more effective than ‘command-
nd-control’ regulations. Although PNGV developed some new
echnologies (e.g. lightweight materials, lithium-ion battery cell,
uel-ﬂexible processors for a fuel cell), the Big Three directed most
esearch efforts towards incremental technologies for advanced
iesel engines (e.g. lean-burn NOx catalysts, diesel direct fuel injec-
ion systems) and (diesel) hybrid powertrains (Mondt, 2000).
.2.2.4. Foreign automakers. In response to the ZEV mandate and
NGV, Toyota decided to develop a car with 100% fuel economy
mprovement, which in 1997 resulted in the Toyota Prius hybrid car.
n 1997, Honda also demonstrated their Insight hybrid car (Doyle,
000). HEVs were initially derided by American automakers,
ecause twin-powertrains substantively increased costs. GM per-
eived HEVs as ‘interim’ technology, and decided instead to focus
n fuel cells, which would “make hybrids obsolete” (MacCormack,
005, p. 15). DaimlerBenz pioneered FCVs and unveiled a cum-
ersome prototype, the NECAR I [New Electric Car], in 1994. The
maller NECAR II (1996) triggered more enthusiasm (Budde et al.,
012) and put fuel cells on the map  of zero-emission technologies.
.2.2.5. Market positioning strategies. Climate change hardly
ffected American automakers’ market positioning strategies,
hich were ﬁrmly oriented towards selling proﬁtable light-trucks.
ar and truck sales fell in the early 1990s, because of the economic
ecession, causing major ﬁnancial problems (Fig. 5). GM suffered
ajor losses, because of additional expenditures for pension-fund
ommitments (Ingrassia, 2010). The ﬁnancial situation improved
fter 1993, because of the booming light-truck market.
.3. Political stalemate and defensive hedging (1997–2005)
.3.1. Pressures around issue
.3.1.1. Social movements, public attention. Public attention
ncreased in 1997 (Fig. 2a) because of the U.N. meting in Kyoto
Japan). Progressive businesses such as the Pew Center on Global
limate Change began to endorse the climate change issue
Rothenberg and Levy, 2012), advancing a ‘win–win’ discourse,
hich argued that proactive climate change strategies could ben-
ﬁt businesses. In 1999, environmentalists ﬁled a petition to the
PA requesting it to undertake its ‘mandatory duty’ of regulating
otor vehicle GHG emissions (Meltz, 2008).
.3.1.2. Policy-makers. At the global level, the Kyoto Protocol
1997), in which many countries pledged to reduce GHG emissions
y an average of 5% below 1990 levels by 2012, was a signif-
cant political step. Although the U.S. played a key role in the
egotiations, Clinton/Gore never submitted the treaty for Senate
atiﬁcation, because they anticipated rejection (Doyle, 2000). In
urope automakers signed a ‘voluntary’ agreement (in 1998) with
he European Commission to reduce average new car emissions to
40 gCO2 per kilometre (∼=39 MPG) by 2008–2009.
In 2001, the newly elected President Bush (junior) rejected the
yoto Protocol for being ‘unfair and ineffective’, creating regulatoryPolicy 44 (2015) 1029–1048
stalemate at the Federal level. Some U.S. congressmen proposed
legislation to address GHG emissions. Senators McCain and Lieber-
man, for instance, proposed a cap-and-trade system in 2003, but
the bill was never voted on. Other bills also faced strong oppo-
sition (Yergin, 2011). In 2003, EPA denied the petition ﬁled by
environmental groups, arguing that EPA did not have authority
under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs (Meltz, 2008). The State of
Massachusetts (with eleven other states, three cities, two U.S. ter-
ritories, and several environmental NGOs) appealed, but this was
rejected by an Appeals Court in 2005.
Although the government did not regulate, it stimulated tech-
nological development, particularly of fuel cells, with the 2003
FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership and the 2004 Hydrogen Fuel Ini-
tiative, a $1.2 billion research-funding project. These programmes,
which were primarily motivated by energy security and only secon-
darily by climate change, tripled available funding and contributed
to fuel-cell enthusiasm (Bakker et al., 2012).
Climate change policy also experienced difﬁculties in Califor-
nia. Because of limited market demand for low-emission vehicles,
CARB’s fourth ZEV-mandate review (1998) gave automakers more
ﬂexibility, e.g. postponing some requirements, establishing a credit
system (Kemp, 2005). In 2001, CARB recognized further barriers
(cost, lead-time, technical challenges) and further amended the
mandate, requiring only 2%-sales of ‘pure-ZEVs’ (BEVs and fuel cell
vehicles) by 2003 (Kemp, 2005). It also accommodated latest tech-
nological developments, so that ‘Advanced Technology Partial Zero
Emission Vehicles’ (e.g. HEVs) and ‘Partial Zero Emission Vehicles’
(e.g. natural gas and other aICE vehicles) could be used to meet
the other 8% requirement. Automakers contested the amendment
in court (see below), resulting in a court decision (2002) that pro-
hibited CARB to enforce the programme. To overcome the political
gridlock CARB’s 2003 amendments removed all references to fuel
economy, delayed the ZEV requirements to 2005, and included a
new compliance path to promote the diffusion of fuel cell vehicles:
automakers would be exempted from the 2% pure-ZEV requirement
if they increased sales of FCVs from 250 by 2008 to 50,000 by 2017.
Another development was that California adopted the Pavley Act
in 2002, which instructed CARB to regulate GHG emissions from
motor vehicles (Sperling and Gordon, 2009). In 2004 CARB issued
new rules requiring 30% reductions in new car GHG emissions by
2016 (Lutsey, 2012).
5.3.2. Car industry issue responses
5.3.2.1. Socio-cultural strategies. American automakers initially
endorsed the GCC approach of contesting climate science, inﬂu-
encing public opinion and lobbying Washington politicians (Doyle,
2000). But in the late-1990s, they changed their position because of
several reasons: (a) fear that climate denial campaigns would dam-
age their reputation in the context of increasing public concerns
(Doyle, 2000); (b) foreign automakers beneﬁtted from a ‘halo effect’
on their reputations for selling ‘greener’ cars (Abeles, 2004); and (c)
American automakers faced credibility pressures from constructive
business coalitions (Pew Center)  and the ‘win–win’ business dis-
course. Ford abandoned the GCC in 1999, acknowledging climate
change and calling upon the auto industry to show leadership. GM
and Chrysler followed in 2000. This was  a major change in posi-
tion, weakening the industry’s closed industry front (Rothenberg
and Levy, 2012).
5.3.2.2. Political strategies. Although American automakers
acknowledged the climate change problem, they politically
opposed Federal fuel economy standards. Also in California they
testiﬁed against the ZEV mandate in CARB’s 2000 hearings, arguing
that consumers were not willing to pay for BEVs (Sperling and
Gordon, 2009). Automakers argued in favour of the ‘more promis-
ing’ fuel cell technologies, and cited their voluntary research
C.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048 1041
Fig. 6. Sales of HEVs in the U.S. market by model.
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nitiatives to argue that regulation was not needed (Doyle, 2000).
lthough CARB relaxed ZEV requirements in 2001, the industry
pposed any kind of ZEV mandate. GM therefore led a lawsuit
gainst CARB, arguing that the ZEV-mandate was  pre-empted by
ederal CAFE standards (Meltz, 2008). The underlying motivation
as that carmakers preferred to discuss climate change regulations
t the Federal level, where they had a powerful lobbying force and
upport of many congressmen (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
Automakers also opposed the Pavley Act (2002), suing the state
f California by questioning (a) whether GHG was  a pollutant under
he CAA (which would allow California to set stricter emission stan-
ards); and (b) whether setting GHG emission standards was  the
ame as setting CAFE standards (which was a Federal and not a
tate-level duty) (Meltz, 2008). The legal processes dragged on,
aining automakers several years of delay. Additionally, Detroit
utomakers secured ‘political favours’ from the Bush administra-
ion such as extended CAFE credits for vehicles that can burn E85,
ven if those vehicles never use anything but gasoline (Sperling and
ordon, 2009).
.3.2.3. Innovation strategies. On technical dimensions, American
utomakers hedged. On the one hand, their main orientation
emained the incremental improvement of ICEs and the marketing
f ﬂex-fuel vehicles. The combined share of aICE and FFV/biofuel
atents in the Big Three annual portfolio trebled from 0.5% in 1996
o an average of 1.5% in 1997–2005 (Fig. 3d). On the other hand,
hey accelerated investments in alternative powertrain technolo-
ies, but without strong intention of mass-marketing (Doyle, 2000).
onger-term technology strategies shifted from battery-electric
ehicles to fuel cell vehicles (Van den Hoed, 2005), causing a change
n industry attention (Fig. 3a) and industry patenting (Fig. 3c).
merican carmakers also established the California Fuel Cell Part-
ership (1999), which was a cooperative joint-venture between
ARB, incumbent automakers and oil companies (Sperling and
ordon, 2009). From 2000 to 2007, fuel cell enthusiasm resulted in
ncreasing numbers of hydrogen/fuel cell prototypes and optimistic
romises about technological developments and commercializa-
ion (Bakker and van Lente, 2009). But gradually these promises
ere projected further (‘about 10–15 years’) into the future, caus-ng deﬂation of the hydrogen hype after 2006/7 (Bakker, 2010).
The PNGV made limited contributions to new technology
evelopment, with the industry’s trade journal Automotive News
ecognizing that the Partnership produced ‘few tangible results’ed 13.02.13).
(Stoffer, 2002). Critics claimed that the beneﬁts of PNGV were more
political than technological.
5.3.2.4. Foreign automakers. PNGV had an unintended conse-
quence, because foreign automakers perceived it as a serious
technology development programme (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
In response, Toyota and Honda pushed the commercialization of
HEVs, while Daimler-Benz (DaimlerChrysler from mid-1998) led
fuel cell developments. The two-seater Honda Insight (introduced
in the U.S. market in 1999) and the Toyota Prius (introduced in
2000) boosted the environmental and technological reputation of
Japanese companies (Abeles, 2004). The Prius, in particular, became
a personal statement of environmental consciousness (Abeles,
2004). Hybrid sales accelerated after 2004 and led to an innova-
tion race in subsequent years, with the number of models for sale
jumping from 5 in 2004 to 40 in 2011 (Fig. 6).
In this period, DaimlerChrysler became a leader in FCVs, ﬁtting a
fuel-cell system (costing $35,000 apiece) on a 5-seat passenger car
in 1999 (NECAR 4). This led its Chairman to declare that “the race to
develop the fuel cell car is over [. . .]  Now we  begin the race to lower
the cost to the level of today’s internal combustion engine. We’ll do
it by 2004” (quoted in The Economist, 1999, p. 88). In 2000, Daim-
lerChrysler announced investments of $1.4 billion to bring FCVs
to market (Van den Hoed, 2005), with goals to sell 40,000 FCVs
by 2004 and 100,000 by 2006 (Sperling and Gordon, 2009). These
optimistic announcements triggered a ‘fuel cell hype’ and R&D race,
with most car companies investing in FCV-research (Bakker, 2010)
(see also Fig. 3a and b). FCVs seemed promising because of energy
efﬁciency, quietness, quick refuelling, and zero emissions, without
compromising on performance. But high relative costs and the lack
of a hydrogen infrastructure formed problems for market uptake
(Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
5.3.2.5. Market positioning strategies. The Big Three’s positioning
strategy continued to focus on ﬂex-fuel vehicles, which helped
them obtain CAFE credits. By 2005, ﬂex-fuel vehicles (4.22%) made
up the bulk of total AFV sales (5.04% of total U.S. light-duty sales)
(Fig. 4a). In 2002, when it leased only 457 units of the second
generation EV1, GM decided to discontinue production and lease
contracts (Sperling and Gordon, 2009). This decision aligned with
GM’s political position (opposing ZEV mandate and climate change
regulations) and shifting strategy towards fuel cells. The decision
had negative reputational effects, because critics claimed that
1042 C.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Research Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048
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t was a political move to obstruct the ZEV programme (e.g. the
ocumentary Who  killed the electric car?, launched in 2006 by a
ormer EV1-leasee).
Overall market conditions for American automakers continued
o decline. As foreign ﬁrms (especially Japanese automakers) gained
arket share, American automakers became increasingly reliant
n the light-truck segment (Ingrassia, 2010). World-wide pres-
ures accelerated consolidation in the global automotive industry,
ith Chrysler merging with Daimler (1998), Hyundai taking over
ia (1998); Renault and Nissan establishing the Renault-Nissan
lliance (1999); Ford acquiring Volvo (1999); GM acquiring Saab
2000).
.4. Changing gear (2005–2009)
.4.1. Pressures around issue
.4.1.1. Public attention. Public attention greatly accelerated after
005 reaching an unprecedented peak in 2007 (Fig. 2a), because
f several catalytic events: (a) Hurricane Katrina (2005) became a
owerful image of potential consequences of climate change; (b)
ony Blair declared climate change a top priority at the 2005 G8
eeting; (c) Al Gore’s movie An Inconvenient Truth (2007) boosted
limate change awareness; (d) the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report
2007) reported a scientiﬁc consensus about an ‘unequivocal warm-
ng trend’; (e) the IPCC and Al Gore were awarded the Nobel Peace
rize (2007). Increasing public attention created pressure on poli-
ymakers and industry.
.4.1.2. Policy-makers. Oil prices, which had been rising steeply
ince 2003 (Fig. 7), caused concerns for the re-elected (2004) Bush
dministration, resulting in the 2005 Energy Act and the Energy
ndependence and Security Act (2007). These acts signalled a shift
n policy-orientation, because they were the ﬁrst comprehensive
nergy policies in more than a decade. They also contributed to
nlocking the Federal regulatory stalemate. While these Acts were
rimarily motivated by oil prices and energy security concerns, they
lso stimulated low-carbon technologies in the transport domain.
he 2005 Energy Act mandated a 100%-increase in the volume of
thanol mixed with gasoline between 2006–2012, and provided
&D subsidies for HEVs, FCV and advanced battery research. The
007 Act mandated a further increase in biofuel production to 36
illion U.S. gallons by 2022 (Sperling and Gordon, 2009), making
iofuels into a crucial national strategy and stimulating the diffu-
ion of ﬂex-fuel vehicles (Fig. 4a). The 2007 Act also raised CAFEin the U.S. in real 2011 dollars.
d 31.10.12).
standards to 35 MPG  by 2020, linking energy security and fuel efﬁ-
ciency to the climate change agenda.
In Europe, frustration with automakers, which were on track to
miss the voluntary 1998 agreement, led policymakers (in 2007) to
issue mandatory car-emission standards for 2015 (130 gCO2/km or
∼=42 MPG). Japan followed suit, setting its standard at 125 gCO2/km
(or ∼=44 MPG) for 2015.
Also in 2007, a judicial decision about the 1999 petition broke
the regulatory deadlock. In the case Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Supreme Court ruled that (a) carbon dioxide and other GHGs are
‘pollutants’, and thus regulated under 1990 CAA; and (b) the CAA
does not authorize EPA to make policy considerations (Meltz, 2008).
This judicial order meant that existing fuel efﬁciency and environ-
mental regulations could be extended to address climate change. It
thus gave CARB the right to legislate GHG emissions in California.
But CARB did not yet gain the means to implement the legislation,
because automakers successfully lobbied the Administration not to
grant California the necessary waiver (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
The argument was  that the 2007 Energy Act, which tightened fuel
economy standards, pre-empted the need for California to have its
own  GHG standards (Sperling and Gordon, 2009).
5.4.2. Car industry issue responses
5.4.2.1. Socio-cultural strategies. In response to escalating pub-
lic concerns, automakers acknowledged climate change in their
annual reports and signalled their engagement with sustainable
mobility (Shinkle and Spencer, 2012). Marketing strategies also
embraced sustainability messages (Abeles, 2004).
5.4.2.2. Political strategies. In 2007, GM,  Ford and Chrysler joined
the U.S. Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), which promoted
market-based approaches (e.g. cap-and-trade legislation) rather
than standards for GHG emissions (Yergin, 2011).
5.4.2.3. Innovation strategies. By 2006–2007 fuel cell enthusiasm
began to diminish because of cost problems, technological barriers
(e.g. hydrogen storage), and lack of hydrogen fuelling stations. The
fuel cell hype was  superseded by new expectations about HEVs,
PHEVs, and BEVs (Fig. 3a and c). By 2005, sales of HEVs accelerated
(Fig. 6), stimulating industry attention and patenting (Fig. 3a and
c). Toyota’s ﬁrst-mover advantages triggered an innovation race
(Fig. 6) with American automakers boosting their R&D and patent-
ing activities (Fig. 3c and d), and introducing their own HEV-models.
Ford produced its ﬁrst full-hybrid (Escape) in 2004 (using licensed
earch Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048 1043
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The Viability Plan was reviewed by the Presidential Task Force
on the Auto Industry (ATF), which Obama created for fear of
being accused of interfering with day-to-day management. The
ATF rejected the focus on green cars, because of limited ﬁnancial
Table 5
Investment plans in GMs  ﬁrst Viability Plan (2008).
Technology Fuel economy
improvement
impact
2009–2012
investment
Hybrid (BAS+) 12–15% $467MC.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Res
echnology from Toyota) and GM in 2007 (Sperling and Gordon,
009).
.4.2.4. Foreign automakers and new entrants. BEVs were revital-
zed by foreign automakers such as Renault-Nissan, which in 2002
nnounced a breakthrough in lithium-ion battery technology that
ould extend the driving range (Yergin, 2011). Renault-Nissan
romised to market BEVs in 2010. A new automaker, Tesla Motors,
urther reinforced attention, due to its marketing of the Tesla Road-
ter (2006) in terms of style, verve, and performance, which gave
EVs a positive symbolic meaning (Yergin, 2011). The subsequent
urge in interest in BEVs (Fig. 3a) spurred other automakers to
econsider the technology.
.4.2.5. Market positioning strategies. Economic positioning of
merican automakers continued to focus on biofuels and ﬂex-fuel
ehicles, which sold in increasing numbers (Fig. 4a). The HEV mar-
et, which expanded rapidly after 2005, also attracted attention.
oyota’s second-generation Prius, larger and more powerful but at
imilar price ($20,000), led the way. By 2007, Prius was the 8th top
elling car in the U.S (13 for all light-duty vehicles) (Sperling and
ordon, 2009). Other companies followed, leading to an innovation
ace and a rapid increase in the number of available models. Abso-
ute HEV sales peaked in 2007 (Fig. 6), corresponding to about 2%
f the U.S. light-duty vehicle market (Fig. 4b).
General market conditions worsened, as rising oil prices
epressed sales of light-trucks. To continue to sell SUVs, Ameri-
an carmakers offered a range of ‘marketing gimmicks’, such as
ero interest loans, rebates and free options. They also aimed to
over automotive losses with proﬁts from ﬁnancial divisions, which
iversiﬁed into mortgages, including sub-prime (Ingrassia, 2010).
eclining light-truck sales and ‘legacy’ costs (pensions, health care)
aused major losses for American automakers, bottoming at net
osses of $40.5 billion for GM in 2007 (Fig. 5), when the subprime
ubble burst. The outbreak of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis caused major
nancial troubles for the Big Three.
.5. The climate change issue at crossroads (2009–2012)
.5.1. Pressures around issue
.5.1.1. Public attention. After 2007 public attention to climate
hange declined substantially (Fig. 2a), because concerns shifted
o the ﬁnancial/economic crisis. Additionally, conservative groups
nd think-tanks sponsored ‘climate change deniers’ who tried to
eopen the scientiﬁc debate (McCright and Dunlap, 2010). These
ctivities succeeded in creating more doubt in public opinions
bout climate change.
.5.1.2. Policy-makers. International pressure also weakened,
ecause climate negotiations in Copenhagen (2009) failed. In
urban (2011) countries agreed to delay talks about a successor
reaty to Kyoto until 2015, which might come into force in 2020.
At the Federal level, however, the newly elected (2008) Obama
dministration strengthened regulatory pressures on automak-
rs. The administration also bailed out Chrysler and GM (in
009), which went bankrupt during the economic crisis. Using his
trengthened negotiating position, Obama secured an agreement
n CAFE and GHG emission standards between auto companies,
overnment agencies (EPA and NHTSA), and California. Subse-
uently, executive branch activity increased sharply (Fig. 2b), with
PA and NHTSA accelerating the creation and implementation of
obile GHG-emission regulations and stricter CAFE-standards. Theesulting 2009 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Stan-
ards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Rule (the ‘LDV
ule’) created GHG emission standards for light-duty vehicles start-
ng in 2012, which increased 5% per year, until reaching 35.5 MPGFig. 8. Amendments to California’s ZEV regulation
Source: CARB (2012, p. 3).
by 2016. The rules also allowed California to start implementing
the Pavley Act in 2009. In 2011, the Federal government, California
and automakers agreed on long-term GHG/CAFE standards (Lutsey,
2012), which would increase to 54.5 MPG  by 2025. These GHG reg-
ulations remain weaker than those in Europe (and Japan), which is
considering 95 gCO2/km (∼=60 MPG) for 2020.
Obama not only tightened regulations, but also supported green
innovation. As part of the ‘green stimulus’ programme, he pro-
moted a domestic battery industry, issuing $5-billion in grants and
loan guarantees to battery makers, entrepreneurs, major auto com-
panies and equipment suppliers (Dijk et al., 2013). Obama also
promised to bring one million PHEVs and BEVs to the road by 2015,
signalling a shift in Federal technology priority from hydrogen/fuel
cells to battery-electric vehicles (Bakker et al., 2012).
The stalemate for the California ZEV-regulations was  unlocked
by the 2007 Supreme Court decision and 2009 Obama deal with the
automakers. CARB also modiﬁed the regulations to accommodate
PHEVs: it created a new compliance path for 2012–2014, which
allowed carmakers to sell less FCVs (ZEVs) and more PHEVs. But a
2012 amendment increased requirements for both ZEVs and PHEVs
to 15.4% of annual sales in 2025 (CARB, 2012) (Fig. 8). Nine other
U.S. states began procedures to also adopt a ZEV-mandate.
5.5.2. Car industry issue responses
5.5.2.1. Socio-cultural strategies. To increase the chances of Fed-
eral bailouts, American automakers tried to enhance their social
and political legitimacy by subscribing to environmental and fuel
economy expectations. GM’s ﬁrst Viability Plan (December 2008),
for instance, claimed that: “General Motors well understands the
challenges to energy security and the climate (. . .)  and believes
that (. . .)  we must look to advanced vehicle technologies to reduce
petroleum dependency and greenhouse gas emissions” (p. 4). With
the surging interest in electric vehicles, automakers also showcased
PHEV and BEV concept-cars such as the Chevy Volt. The ﬁrst Via-
bility Plan therefore included ambitious investment plans in green
technologies (Table 5).Strong hybrid (large vehicle) 30–35% $515M
Strong hybrid (small vehicle) 35–55% $315M
Extended range electric vehicle
(e.g. Volt)
100–120% $758M
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Table 6
Sales in the U.S. market of selected PHEV and BEV models.
2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Chevy Volt (PHEV) 326 7,671 23,461 23,094 54,552
Nissan Leaf (BEV) 19 9,674 9,819 22,610 42,122
Toyota Prius (PHEV) – – 12,750 12,088 26,838
Tesla Model S (BEV) – – 2,620 18,650 21,270044 C.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Res
rospects (Rattner, 2010). GM’s second Viability Plan (2009) there-
ore paid less attention to green innovation and did not include
reen resource allocations.
.5.2.2. Political strategies. Because Detroit automakers needed
ederal funds for survival, they became more cooperative towards
nvironmental regulations and signed up to various CARB and CAFE
greements. But by 2012 they resumed defensive political strate-
ies, arguing and lobbying against the ZEV-mandate. An industry
etition to EPA against California’s regulation argued that: “It is
mpossible to predict today whether infrastructural developments,
il prices, consumer conﬁdence and other factors will converge
uch that automakers will be able to persuade buyers to [buy suf-
cient numbers of electric-drive cars]. Current data and trends
uggest that it is highly unlikely that the industry will be able to
eet that mandate” (cited by Nelson, 2013, online). Automakers
lso opposed the Californian ZEV-mandate in an attempt to dis-
ourage other states from adopting it.
.5.2.3. New entrants. Most new automakers struggled in this
eriod. Tesla Motors requested a $350-million loan-guarantee in
009 from the Department of Energy to develop a new model. After
osting successive ﬁnancial losses, Tesla announced its ﬁrst-ever
uarterly proﬁts (and the only one to date) in early 2013, managing
o repay its loan-guarantee earlier than expected. In the same year,
t began sales of its Model-S, an award-winning battery-electric
edan that was cheaper than the high-performance Tesla Road-
ter. Fisker Automotive, which began selling a PHEV-model in 2011,
ent bankrupt two years later. BetterPlace, which pioneered a new
usiness model based on leasing ‘switchable batteries’, also went
ankrupt in 2013. BYD Auto (from China), which never delivered on
ts promise to sell an all-electric minivan model in the U.S. market,
eported a 98% plunge in proﬁts in 2012.
.5.2.4. Innovation strategies. Before the crisis Ford and GM dis-
layed BEV and PHEV-prototypes (Chevy Volt, Ford Airstream). GM
ven announced production plans for the Volt, signalling a shift in
trategy from fuel cells to electric-drive vehicles. The ﬁnancial crisis
reated delays, because the ATF was unenthusiastic about the Volt.
ut in 2010 the ﬁrst Volt rolled off the factory production lines.
Following the (re)established Californian ZEV-regulations,
utomakers announced BEV commercialization plans to meet
equired sale-quotas. The Green Car Reports qualiﬁed many mod-
ls (Chevrolet Spark EV, Ford Focus Electric, Honda Fit EV, Toyota
AV4 EV, and the Fiat 500e) as ‘compliance cars’, which are “not
eant to lure in consumers, or sell in any kind of volume. They’re
nly built to meet California regulations for zero-emission vehicles”
Voelcker, 2012, online). These models, which are conversions of
xisting gasoline vehicles rather than purposively built BEVs, are
old below cost-price.
Despite the BEV-push, advanced-ICE (and ﬂex-fuel) technolo-
ies remained automakers’ preferred strategy to improve fuel
fﬁciency, leading to accelerated deployment of aICE technologies
uch as variable valve timing, continuously variable transmission,
asoline direct injection, turbocharging, six-speed transmission,
ylinder deactivation, and diesel engines (Lutsey, 2012).
.5.2.5. Market positioning strategies. The $3-billion ‘Cash for
lunkers’ scheme (2009), which offered consumers $3500–4500
ebates, stimulated demand for HEVs and fuel efﬁcient ICE-vehicles
Dijk et al., 2013). BEVs and PHEVs also entered the market, but sales
emained low (Fig. 4b; Table 6), because of high prices.14
14 Even with favourable $7500 Federal tax credits (and other state incentives),
hese models cost almost twice as much as similar ICE-models.Source: Data from http://hybridcar.com and http://green.autoblog.com/ (last
accessed 23.03.14).
Because of the economic crisis, general market conditions
worsened dramatically. Plummeting sales caused major ﬁnancial
problems for Chrysler and GM (Fig. 5). The government rescued
both companies with a managed bankruptcy (2009) and substantial
bailout ($8 billion and $30 billion loans to Chrysler and GM respec-
tively), with Chrysler being later acquired by Fiat. All American
automakers subsequently restructured (shutting down factories,
reducing staff, disinvesting brands), cut costs and returned to prof-
itability.
6. Analysis and discussion
6.1. Pattern-matching
The case study addressed one of the paper’s goals, namely
describing how American automakers engaged with the unfold-
ing climate change problem. The case study showed, on the one
hand, that the climate change problem had dynamics related to
activities from various social groups (scientists, social movements,
public attention, policymakers). On the other hand, it showed that
industry responses and technical solutions had their own  com-
plex dynamics, which related not just to R&D investments, but also
to broader beliefs, corporate and political strategies. To provide a
further explanation, we  perform a pattern-matching analysis (Yin,
1994; Geels and Penna, 2015), which compares core dynamics and
mechanisms in the empirical periods with those predicted by the
DILC-model for different conceptual phases.
The ﬁrst period (1979–1988) matches well with DILC’s phase 1:
(a) scientists and environmentalists engaged in sense-making and
draw attention to the problem; (b) ﬁrms remained unconcerned. A
minor deviation from the conceptual phase 1 was that politicians
engaged in early symbolic action (some Senate hearings and a letter
by Al Gore and others).
The second period (1988–1997) displayed important dynam-
ics of DILC’s phase 2: (a) increasing public attention; (b) symbolic
political action at the Federal level (publicized Senate hearings) and
global level (UNFCC, 1992), accompanied by the early build-up of a
policy sub-system; (c) creation of a closed industry-front (GCC). But
the period also had some deviations from the conceptual model: (1)
at the state level, California’s Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) man-
date formed a strong piece of regulation, which the model predicts
in phase 4; (2) early engagement of macro-politicians (Presidents
Bush Senior and Clinton), which the model posits to phase 4; and
(3) an incumbent ﬁrm (GM) introduced a radical innovation (BEV),
which the model predicts in phase 4. Nevertheless, we argue that
this period is best characterized as phase 2, because of the follow-
ing qualiﬁcations of the second and third deviation: the enactment
of California’s ZEV-mandated was  motivated by local air pollution
concerns; the macro-political Federal actions (mainly the USABC
and PNGV partnerships) were not radical, but actually served to
reinforce the closed industry front; GM promoted BEVs for rep-
utational reasons, not in reaction to climate change concerns or
regulation.
The third period (1997–2005) had a good match with phase 3
in the DILC-model, because: (a) public attention to climate change
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hedge and develop capabilities in multiple low-carbon technolo-
gies (see next section).16C.C.R. Penna, F.W. Geels / Res
urther increased; (b) specialist expertise was elaborated in policy
ub-systems (CARB, PNGV, USABC); (c) automakers acknowledged
he problem, but opposed it politically causing controversy and
eadlock; (d) limited macro-political pressure because Congress
nd the Bush-administration opposed regulation; and (e) automak-
rs moved towards hedging strategies, maintaining their overall
ommitment to aICE and biofuels/FFV, but increasing R&D invest-
ents in more radical alternatives. The period also had a few
eviations, because it included some elements from phase 4: (1) the
olitical industry-front weakened as ﬁrms abandoned the GCC in
he late 1990s; (2) foreign ﬁrms (Toyota, Daimler) aimed to secure
rst-mover advantages with radical innovations (HEV, FCV), which
opened up’ the industry front, and triggered innovation races.
The fourth period (2005–2009) had some elements from
hase 4 in the DILC-model: (a) sharp increase in public
ttention; (b) engagement of macro-political actors (second Bush-
dministration, Supreme Court); (c) spillovers to the economic task
nvironment through the emergence of markets for low-carbon
echnologies; (d) further opening up of the industry-front and inno-
ation races in FCV, HEV and biofuels/FFV. Because many of these
evelopments pointed in the ‘right’ direction, we qualiﬁed this
eriod as ‘changing gear’. But the period also had elements of phase
, because some developments were not yet very strong: (1) reg-
latory pressure remained limited (because Federal policies were
ot radical); (2) market niches for electric drive vehicles remained
mall (2–3%); (3) continuing commitment of automakers to aICE
nd biofuels/FFV; (4) automakers did not fully commit to more
adical alternatives for fear of making the wrong bet (which is rein-
orced by the experience of hype-cycles). This period is therefore
est characterized as a ‘phase 3½’.
The ﬁfth period (2009–2012) is also ambiguous, because devel-
pments point in different directions. On the ‘positive’ side, this
eriod has some elements of the conceptual phase 4: (a) climate
hange was addressed at the macro-political level (Obama admin-
stration); (b) administrative activity remained high (Fig. 2b); (c)
he political position of U.S. automakers weakened (because of
ankruptcy and bailout), which made them more receptive to social
nd political expectations about fuel efﬁciency and climate change;
d) automakers jockeyed for position with various low-carbon
echnologies, leading to high patenting activity across multiple
ategories (Fig. 3c and d). But the period also had ‘negative’ devel-
pments, which ﬁt with phase 3: (1) decreasing public attention
Fig. 2a); (2) political attention to climate change decreased after
009 (Fig. 2b); (3) new regulations are not radical and do not cre-
te a new market segment; (4) markets for HEV, BEV, PHEV remain
mall (2–3% of overall sales); (5) automakers remain committed to
ICE and biofuels/FFV. Although car companies continue to invest
n radical green options, they did not fully commit to any of them.
his period is therefore also best characterized as a ‘phase 3½’ with
onﬂicting developments.
This analysis suggests that most empirical periods had a rel-
tively good match with a particular phase in the DILC-model.
owever, we should not expect a perfect match between the ideal-
ypical DILC-model and complex real-world cases. And, indeed,
ost periods were more complex in the sense that they contained
haracteristics from multiple phases. Nevertheless, we  were able to
ive a main qualiﬁcation of each period in terms of the DILC-model.
.2. Assessing the degree of low-carbon reorientation
For the 33-year period, we identify an overall pattern, in which
he climate change issue lifecycle followed the following phase-
equence: 1–2–3–3½–3½. This suggests that the issue lifecycle and
ndustry reorientation got stuck between phases 3 and 4 in the last
wo periods (2005–2009, 2009–2012). One explanation, in terms
f the DILC-model, is that problem-related pressures have notPolicy 44 (2015) 1029–1048 1045
sufﬁciently increased and aligned to stimulate automakers towards
fuller reorientation. Most pressures were increasing in the ﬁrst
three periods, except for political pressures, which weakened both
at the Federal and state levels. In the fourth period, pressures from
social movements, scientists and wider publics increased strongly
and there were some spillovers to market demand, also through
the action of new entrants (e.g. Tesla). But the political pressure
remained relatively weak, and was not strong enough to substan-
tially affect mass markets (as the DILC-model would require for
a shift towards phases 4 and 5). In the ﬁfth period, political pres-
sures grew somewhat stronger (although not ‘technology-forcing’),
but pressure from social movements, science and public attention
weakened considerably because of the ﬁnancial-economic crisis.
Market pressures also stagnated, despite ‘cash for clunkers’ and
other stimulus programmes. This analysis is summarized in Table 7.
So, one part of the explanation of the lifecycle being ‘stuck’ is that
the various pressures related to the climate change problem are not
yet large enough, nor well-aligned,15 to stimulate full reorientation.
The spillovers to the economic environment are still contained, as
indicated by relatively small markets and not very tough policies,
both of which are insufﬁcient to motivate automakers to accelerate
their strategies away from ICE technology.
The other part of the explanation relates to ﬁrm strategies and
commitments to the industry regime. Although ﬁrms implemented
some changes in elements of the industry regime, these changes
are not yet very substantial or comprehensive. Firstly, automakers
have developed some competencies in radically new technologies
(fuel cells, electric drive). But they have not fully committed to
them, giving instead more priority to the elaboration of existing
competencies via advanced-ICE and biofuels/FFV. Secondly, indus-
try beliefs have changed somewhat, with automakers no longer
denying the climate change problem, and perceiving it as a rele-
vant issue. But addressing climate change has not yet entered core
mindsets or become part of the industry’s identity and mission.
Thirdly, industry-speciﬁc policies have been introduced, initially
via technology-development programmes (USABC, PNGV, Hydro-
gen Fuel Initiative), and recently also via CAFE and fuel economy
regulations. While these regulations create pressure on the indus-
try, they are not radical policies and allow for compliance with aICE
technologies.
This empirical assessment ﬁts with the DILC-model, which sug-
gests that substantial regime change does not happen until phase
4 or 5. In fact, the case shows much inertia related to: (a) the
industry’s economic orientation towards, and dependence on, large
gas-guzzling cars; (b) the industry’s belief that Americans prefer
big cars; (c) policies (in period 2–4) with loopholes as a result of
industry lobbying; (d) sunk investments in ICE technology, which
American carmakers continue to defend with incremental innova-
tion strategies (aICE, biofuels/FFV). The innovation races in FCV,
HEV, and BEV have begun to undermine ICE dominance. But to
avoid risks, manufacturers have so far aimed for “gradual, contained
experimentation [of alternative vehicle technologies], as much as
possible anchored within the status quo” (Wells and Nieuwenhuis,
2012, p. 1686). We  therefore do not expect full industry reorienta-
tion towards radical green options in the next few years, because
of high risks and costs, low market demand, and because of lim-
ited policy pressure. Instead, we  expect automakers to continue to15 Additionally, the climate change problem is currently not very strongly aligned
to  other problems (such as energy security or local air pollution). We thank one
reviewer for emphasizing this point.
16 It is even possible that the climate change issue moves backwards to previ-
ous phases in the DILC-model, if pressures from policymakers, civil society and/or
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Table 7
Summary assessment of the development of climate-change related pressures on the U.S. car industry.
Activists, social movements,
scientists
Civil society (public
attention and concern)
Policymakers (Federal and
California)
Market demand,
consumers
Relative regime
outsiders (suppliers,
foreign ﬁrms, new
entrants)
1979–1988 +/− (academic debates, but no
pressure on car industry)
− − − −
1988–1997 + (issue rising on
environmentalist agenda, new
scientiﬁc evidence of climate
change)
+ (rising public
attention and concern)
Federal: +
California: ++ (ZEV-mandate)
− +/− (Daimler FCV)
1997–2005 ++ (environmental groups
petition EPA, mounting
scientiﬁc evidence)
+ (stagnating public
attention)
Federal: +/− (Bush rejects
Kyoto)
California: + (weakened ZEV,
leading to stalemate)
+/− (small HEV
sales/demand)
+ (Toyota and Honda’s
HEV)
2005–2009 +++ (environmental
movements appeal against EPA
rejection of petition; 2007 IPCC
report + Nobel prize)
+++ (surge in attention,
public sensitivity to
climate change due to
natural catastrophes)
Federal: + (increasing activity
due to issue linkages between
energy security and climate
change)
California: + (CARB new rights
after 2007 Supreme Court
decision)
+ (emerging HEV
sales/demand)
+ (Toyota lead in HEV,
Tesla and other new
entrants)
2009–2012 + (‘climate gate’ scandal;
attempts from climate sceptics
to undermine science base and
create doubt; social
movements focus on economic
issues)
+ (declining public
attention and
sensitivity due to the
economic crisis)
Federal: ++ (new regulation
under Obama, but not very
tough)
California: ++ (Pavley Act and
ZEV-mandate)
+ (stagnating HEV
sales/demand and
small BEV
sales/demand
(2013))
+ (Renault-Nissan push
for BEVs, but
weakening new
entrant pressure)
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.3. Further explanation and conceptual elaborations
A further explanation for the lack of full low-carbon reorienta-
ion is the uncertainty associated with the diversity of technical
olutions and the industry awareness of previous technology
ype-cycles. These uncertainties are likely to delay full industry
eorientation because automakers do not want to commit to the
wrong’ technology. This possibility is not yet accommodated in the
ILC-model, which implicitly assumes that the technical solution
ecomes increasingly clear as the issue lifecycle progresses, so that,
y phase 4, there is a single, clear-cut option towards which ﬁrms
an reorient. Building on the complexity of our case, we  therefore
ropose a conceptual elaboration, namely that the shift from phase
 to phase 4 in the DILC-model requires the convergence of industry
ctors (and other stakeholders) towards a dominant solution.17 The
bsence of convergence in the case provides a further explanation
f why the move towards phase 4 has not yet happened. A broader
mplication is that technical diversity, which innovation scholars
ften see as something positive, may  have drawbacks in the sense
f prolonging hedging (phase 3) and delaying diversiﬁcation and
eorientation (phases 4 and 5).18
arkets weaken further. This analytical possibility (of moving backwards) was high-
ighted by Geels and Penna (2015) and empirically demonstrated with another case
tudy. Alternatively, the climate change lifecycle could regain momentum in the
oming years if it were to align with other problems (e.g. air pollution, energy secu-
ity, rising oil prices). (We  want to thank one reviewer for drawing our attention to
he  potential future importance of issue linkage).
17 The convergence of industry actors also actively contributes to making a solution
ominant. But ﬁrms are not the only relevant actors in creating a dominant solution.
ther actors (e.g. consumers, policymakers) also make contributions.
18 Industry actors and consultants (e.g. McKinsey) are increasingly talking about
he  possibility of sustained diversity in the future, including prolonged co-existence
f  multiple low-carbon technologies. This would raise the prospect of an alterna-
ive  transition pathway, which would not proceed from one dominant technology
o  another (substitution pattern), but from one dominant technology to multiple co-
xisting technologies that are used in different market niches. While not excluding
his possibility, our conceptual model would suggest that this is not a very likelyning depending on previous period) = ‘+’; strong pressure = ‘++’; very strong pres-
As a second elaboration we  propose to nuance the sequential
view of technological reorientation in the DILC-model (incremen-
tal innovation, hedging, diversiﬁcation, full reorientation). Whereas
the DILC-model assumes that incumbent ﬁrms do not engage
in radical innovation until phase 3, the case study showed that
automakers already developed and publicly displayed BEVs in the
second period (followed by FCV, HEV, and PHEV in later periods).
So, rather than a sequential process, radical and incremental inno-
vation co-existed simultaneously in early periods. To explain this
deviation, we  problematize the distinction between symbolic and
substantive action, particularly the idea that technology only rep-
resents substantive action in the economic task environment.19 So,
the DILC-model should be elaborated to accommodate the pos-
sibility that incumbent ﬁrms can use radical innovation as part
of political and socio-cultural strategies towards the institutional
environment. The case study entailed several examples of thispattern, as it will be very costly for car companies to maintain technical capabilities
and  production facilities at large scale for many different options (the co-existence
of  multiple infrastructures for gas, hydrogen and electric recharging would also
be  expensive). At a smaller scale, however, prolonged diversity of various tech-
nical options in small market niches (few per cent market share) would enable
automakers to prolong the lifespan of their dominant technology (internal combus-
tion engines) in mainstream markets. Sustained diversity of multiple low-carbon
options in small market niches would, however, be detrimental with regard to
addressing the climate change problem (since climate scientists indicate that global
emissions should fall after 2020 in order to have a chance to reach the 2-degree
target). (We  want to thank one reviewer for asking us to elaborate our view on the
diversity issue).
19 It is difﬁcult to make ex-ante distinctions between symbolic and substantive
actions, because of inevitable information asymmetries (thanks to one of the review-
ers  for drawing our attention to this point). The various examples of unfulﬁlled
industry promises in our case study do, however, provide a lesson, suggesting that
ﬁrm’s statements about strategic commitment to green cars and related R&D pro-
grammes should be treated with caution by policymakers and not be regarded as
evidence that no further policy action is needed.
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In 1990 GM showcased the Impact for reputational reasons
(which had unintended consequences on CARB’s perception of
BEVs).
The public private partnerships (USABC, PNGV), which ofﬁcially
aimed at developing new technologies, carried costs for the
industry, but also offered political and reputational beneﬁts:
control of technology developments, control over information
provision to policymakers, limiting internal competition, enhanc-
ing public reputation, signalling that self-regulation was better
than formal regulation, signalling willingness to take substantive
action, managing technical expectations.
Toyota improved its green (and innovative) credentials with the
Prius, creating an environmental ‘halo effect’.
The industry shaped social and political expectations by parading
concept cars and prototypes and making promises about mar-
keting plans. It has a track-record of missing these promises, and
deferring new promises further into the future (often 5–10 years).
As a third elaboration, we propose that issue lifecycles are not
nly shaped by internal dynamics (struggles between problem-
elated pressures and industry responses), but also by other
evelopments in the industry’s economic and socio-political envi-
onments (which are thus external to the focal issue). This
laboration further helps explain some salient aspects of the case:
a) although the radical policy in the second period (the 1990 Cal-
fornian ZEV-mandate) had important implications for the climate
hange issue, it was actually introduced in relation to the problem
f local air pollution (this instance of ‘issue linkage’ helps explain
ome deviations from the DILC-model, which we  noted above);
b) another instance of ‘issue linkage’ occurred in the 2005–2009
eriod when attention to energy issues, biofuels, fuel cells, and fuel
fﬁciency increased not just because of climate change, but also
ecause of concerns about rising oil prices and energy security;
o, acceleration in this period partly happened because of cou-
ling between various problems; (c) in last period, climate-change
elated pressures declined because of competition from ﬁnancial-
conomic problems. Our case study therefore shows that internal
roblem-related dynamics and industry responses co-evolve with
xternal developments, which a comprehensive analysis of corpo-
ate low-carbon strategies must take into account.
. Concluding remarks
The paper has shown the usefulness of the DILC-model for
omprehensive analyses of societal problems and industry reori-
ntation. Our analysis of climate change, green cars and industry
eorientation goes beyond many existing studies in the innovation
tudies ﬁeld. Firstly, it looks not only at the ‘solution stream’ (tech-
ical innovations), but also at dynamics in the ‘problem stream’
including multi-dimensional interactions with other problems).
econdly, it looks not only at innovation strategies, but also at polit-
cal, socio-cultural and economic positioning strategies. Thirdly,
t goes beyond single technology studies, looking at multiple low-
arbon innovations. We  suggest that this kind of comprehensive
nalysis can fruitfully be applied to other grand challenges (e.g.
besity, energy security, food safety) and other industries (agro-
ood, coal, oil, electricity, pharmaceuticals). We  further suggest
hat the mixed methods approach in this paper is useful to link
heory (the DILC-model) and empirical analysis. The quantitative
tructural-break analysis helps to systematically identify periods
or the in-depth qualitative case study. Furthermore, the combi-
ation of various time-series is promising to analyze dynamics in
oth the ‘problem stream’ and the ‘solution stream’. These methods
ould be further explored and elaborated in future research.Policy 44 (2015) 1029–1048 1047
Although the DILC-model enables comprehensive analyses, we
note as a qualiﬁer that the paper concentrated on the climate
change problem and focused primarily on technical solutions from
automakers.20 Broader transitions towards sustainable transport,
which should address not just climate change, but also congestion,
air pollution, noise and safety problems, are likely to require low-
carbon propulsion technologies as well as wider system changes
(Geels, 2012), including car sharing, intermodal transport, modal
shift (more cycling and public transport), road pricing, and demand
management. Understanding these wider system changes, which
fall outside the scope of this paper, would probably involve less
focus on the car industry, but still include other mechanisms from
the DILC-model, e.g. socio-political mobilization, ups-and-downs in
public attention, creation of political will, and emergence of mar-
kets. Such an analysis would also need to systematically account for
alignments between multiple problems and how these could lead
to a ‘perfect storm’ that can destabilize existing industries and sys-
tems (see Turnheim and Geels, 2013, for a historical example of this
dynamic).
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